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Executive Summary 
Creating homeownership is a central strategy of community developers, but the success that 
they have realized is threatened by a recent rise in the rate of mortgage foreclosures. Innova-
tions in the mortgage industry, particularly automated underwriting, risk-based pricing and 
stratified securitization, have helped foster the development of mortgage products that are 
flexible and affordable, expanding homeownership opportunities to many households with 
poorer credit ratings and fewer savings for down payment. But these riskier “subprime” 
loans, often made with larger up-front fees and higher interest rates, are foreclosed upon at a 
much higher rate than are prime loans. Subprime lending has also been concentrated in low-
income and high-minority areas, often the very places community developers are trying to 
revitalize.  
Mortgages go into default, the first step toward foreclosure, for a variety of reasons. Research 
on mortgage risk has shown that the equity in the home is the most important determinant of 
the likelihood of mortgage default, demonstrating the risk inherent in low-down payment 
mortgages and in borrowing against home equity for consumption. In addition, life events 
such as job loss, divorce or illness may cause a household to fall behind on mortgage pay-
ments. Properties located in low-income and high-minority areas also show a great 
propensity to default, even controlling for other factors.  
Opportunities for owning a home have increased with the rise of subprime lending (loans of-
fered to generally less creditworthy borrowers at higher costs). Subprime loans default at a 
much higher rate than prime loans, however. Some studies have linked increases in subprime 
lending in certain areas with increases in foreclosures there.  
Community-based development organizations across the country have responded to the in-
crease in foreclosures by providing counseling and loans and by working with local lenders 
to minimize the number of delinquent mortgages that go into foreclosure. Foreclosure-
prevention programs are resource-intensive, however, and community organizations in loca-
tions with high foreclosure rates can be quickly overwhelmed by requests for assistance. 
Nevertheless, many affiliates of the NeighborWorks® network have created successful pro-
grams. These programs have staff with a wide variety of experience, as they must negotiate 
with the lender and servicer staff, and also provide counseling and support to the homeowner. 
Counseling may be needed to cover a variety of topics, including financial education, house-
hold budgeting, job skills or family problems, and often requires partnering with other 
organizations. A number of the foreclosure-prevention programs also provide, or have access 
to, loans and grants to help homeowners restructure their debt and become current on their 
mortgages.  
Two of the most sophisticated foreclosure-prevention programs are run by Neighborhood 
Housing Services of Chicago and NHS of New York City. NHS of Chicago’s target 
neighborhoods were experiencing a foreclosure rate of 7.7 percent, compared to a national 
rate of 1.2 percent. The number of foreclosures was rising quickly, and properties were going 
into foreclosure in a short time. Much of the increase in foreclosures was due to subprime 
lending, which had increased rapidly in Chicago and was particularly common in the target 
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neighborhoods. In response, NHS of Chicago implemented the Home Ownership Preserva-
tion Initiative (HOPI), with the goal of helping 1,500 homeowners in danger of foreclosure to 
keep their homes. HOPI works with local subprime lenders on issues related to foreclosure, 
provides financial assistance through a $2.2 million loan program, and offers counseling to 
help homeowners get out of trouble.  
Foreclosures are also on the rise in a number of the neighborhoods targeted by NHS of New 
York City. NHS of NYC has seen foreclosure rates in seven of its target neighborhoods that 
are more than twice the overall city rate. The target neighborhoods have also seen a 60 per-
cent increase in the number of subprime loans in just two years. The organization’s 
foreclosure-prevention program includes early-delinquency intervention, classroom training 
and one-on-one counseling, and financial assistance. NHS of NYC has developed partner-
ships with many national organizations to combat predatory lending and assist senior citizens 
who are having financial problems.  
Advances in mortgage underwriting and securitization have allowed lenders to create prod-
ucts that have expanded homeownership opportunities. These products, often higher-cost 
subprime mortgages, carry a greater risk of default and foreclosure. As subprime loan origi-
nations increasingly concentrate in low-income and minority neighborhoods, so do 
foreclosures. The extension of riskier mortgages by lenders may be greater than revitalizing 
neighborhoods can withstand.  
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Combating Foreclosures as Part of a  
Neighborhood Revitalization Strategy 
Creating homeownership opportunities is a central strategy of community development. In-
creasing homeownership in distressed areas stabilizes populations and housing markets, 
creates stakeholders for revitalization and builds the wealth of low-income households. Suc-
cess has been demonstrated by increases in homeownership rates across the country and in 
targeted neighborhoods. These gains are threatened by a recent rise in foreclosure rates, how-
ever, a trend that has the potential to undo in a few years what has taken decades to achieve.  
In recent years, lenders have introduced a number of innovative mortgage products that are 
affordable and flexible, providing access to mortgage capital for many more households. 
These innovative products have been made possible by the automation of the underwriting 
process and advances in mortgage securitization. Automated underwriting has allowed lend-
ers to develop products with smaller down-payment amounts and higher loan-to-value ratios 
that can reach borrowers who have fewer saving. Stratified securitization has allowed for 
riskier mortgage products through risk-based pricing, distributing greater risk to investors in 
exchange for higher returns, generally paid for by higher interest rates on the mortgage.  
Automated underwriting and advances in securitization have also allowed for the recent 
surge in subprime lending, loans made to riskier borrowers in exchange for greater up-front 
costs and higher interest rates. Subprime lenders increased their lending from $90 billion in 
1996 to $375 billion in 2003. This riskier lending has been concentrated disproportionately in 
low- and moderate-income areas and in areas with a high proportion of African-American 
residents. 
With this riskier lending has come a sharp rise in foreclosures in the subprime market. These 
foreclosures have also been concentrated disproportionately in lower-income and minority 
neighborhoods. The question becomes: can distressed neighborhoods withstand the risks that 
changes in mortgage financing have allowed?  
This report begins by describing the foreclosure process, including mortgage default and the 
process for loan workouts. Section One then presents a review of the research on the various 
factors that lead to default and foreclosure. The rise of the subprime market and its relation to 
foreclosures is then described, using recent studies of subprime lending in selected cities and 
counties. Section Two examines the available data on foreclosures and identifies some trends 
in these data. Section Three describes a number of community-based responses to foreclo-
sures and includes a review of an analysis of several community-based foreclosure-
prevention programs. Finally, Section Four presents case studies of foreclosures and foreclo-
sure-prevention programs in Chicago and New York City. 
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Section I: Foreclosure and Default 
Foreclosures: Process, Costs and Loss Mitigation Options 
The Foreclosure Process 
While foreclosure laws vary in specifics from state to state, the foreclosure process generally 
follows a standard process. A mortgage agreement typically includes a provision for the bor-
rower to make monthly payments on a given date. Once the mortgage is originated, 
responsibility for ensuring that cash flows reach their appropriate destination is given to what 
is known as the “servicer.” The loan servicer may be the loan originator or another institu-
tion. The mortgage holder has contact with the servicer and sends the servicer the monthly 
payments. 
The borrower is often charged a late fee for any payment that is 15 days late. If the bor-
rower’s payment is still unpaid by 30 days, the mortgage is said to be in default. The servicer 
will file a Notice of Default with local government authorities and send a letter to the bor-
rower which states that the loan is in default and outlines steps that must be taken to make the 
loan current. Unless arrangements are made with the lender, the mortgage can then go into 
foreclosure. 
When mortgage payments become 90 days late, the lender will generally begin a legal proc-
ess against the owner in order to force the sale of the mortgaged property. The property may 
be sold at a public auction with the proceeds going to pay off the mortgage debt. If the prop-
erty is worth less than the total amount owed on the mortgage, the lender could seek a 
deficiency judgment against the borrower. However, a few states — such as Alaska, Arizona 
and California — have strong anti-deficiency laws and lenders generally do not seek defi-
ciency payments; in addition, the Federal Housing Administration generally does not seek 
deficiency payments on the loans it insures.  
Costs of Foreclosure 
Foreclosures are costly, particularly to mortgage insurers and guarantors, but also to other 
stakeholders, including loan servicers, local governments, neighboring homeowners and the 
mortgage holders themselves. Mortgage insurers lose the portion of the outstanding debt and 
resale costs that the sale of the foreclosed property does not cover, up to their maximum 
guarantee. In 1997, FHA reported average foreclosure losses of $28,000, while the VA re-
ported average losses of $10,600; United Guaranty Corporation, a private insurer, reported an 
average loss of $17,300 on its foreclosed loans (McCarthy et al. 2001). Guarantors such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac realize losses from foreclosures through mortgages sold on the 
secondary market; one study (Moreno 1995) estimated that their average loss per foreclosed 
loan was between $6,400 and $8,000.  
While other stakeholders are not hit as hard or as directly by foreclosures as the insurers and 
guarantors, nevertheless the impacts are real. Loan servicers lose the fee they are paid for 
each mortgage they are servicing that goes into foreclosure. Local governments lose property 
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tax payments, at least temporarily, and they may also incur costs if they must maintain and 
dispose of the property. In addition, local governments can lose tax revenues from other 
properties nearby, as foreclosed properties can have a negative impact upon neighboring 
home values (Wiranowski 2003). Finally, the homeowners themselves lose their homes and 
whatever equity they had in them, and their credit record suffers for years to come. 
When all costs to stakeholders are accounted for, one study estimates that foreclosures can 
cost upwards of $26,000 (McCarthy et al. 2001). With this strong incentive to avoid foreclo-
sure, lending institutions are becoming more adept at loss-mitigation techniques. The success 
rate of loan workouts is now more than 50 percent of those loans that would have gone to 
foreclosure in the past (Capone 2002).  
Loss Mitigation 
The primary loss-mitigation alternatives to foreclosure are the following: 
!"Loan modification: A refinance without closing costs; this option works best when in-
terest rates are low and the borrower cannot qualify for a full refinance, but is capable 
of regular mortgage payments. Some arrears may be included in a modified loan bal-
ance. 
!"Special forbearance: An extended repayment plan. 
!"Preforeclosure: After agreeing with the lender on a loss-sharing arrangement, the 
borrower sells the home. Borrowers are often allowed to pay back their loss share 
over time. Preforeclosure saves foreclosure costs and often fetches a higher price for 
the property. 
!"Deed-in-lieu of foreclosure: The borrower assigns title to the property to the lender 
without going through the foreclosure process, often with the borrower paid some 
cash inducement. 
!"Partial claim: An FHA tool in which FHA puts up funds to make the loan current 
with the servicer in exchange for a promissory note payable when the property is 
sold, to the extent there is equity in the property.  
Loss-mitigation techniques have become more standardized in the industry, and the success 
of loan workouts has increased. As evidence of the success of loss-mitigation efforts, Cutts 
and Green (2004) cite data from the Mortgage Bankers Association’s National Delinquency 
Survey. During the 1990–91 recession, 1.5 million jobs were lost over four quarters, and 
foreclosure rates peaked at 0.83 percent; during the 2001–03 recession, 2.6 million jobs were 
lost, and foreclosure rates peaked at 0.56 percent. Cutts and Green conclude that recent 
changes in mortgage-servicing policies have helped keep delinquent borrowers in their 
homes, with low- and moderate-income borrowers who enter a repayment plan realizing a 68 
percent reduction in the likelihood of home loss.  
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Research on Foreclosures and Defaults 
Lending of any type involves the risk that the loan may not be repaid, and much of the re-
search on mortgages has assessed the factors that may lead to default or foreclosure. This 
research has focused upon homeowner “incentive” to default on loans, and often uses multi-
pliers to determine relative risk. Researchers have concluded that a household “decides” to 
miss a mortgage payment or go into foreclosure based on an assessment of its current finan-
cial situation. This assessment takes into account what members of the household have to 
lose — the equity in the home — and other financial obligations such as consumer debt or 
medical bills.  
Equity and Down Payments 
Most research has considered borrower equity the most important determinant of default. 
When a household has less to lose from foreclosure, it is more likely to default on its mort-
gage. Many new mortgage products allow for smaller down payments, such as three or five 
percent down, and in some cases mortgage products require no down payment at all. While 
these products have allowed low-wealth households to own homes, they also carry greater 
risks. 
One review of the early performance of loans made specifically to promote affordable home-
ownership compared early delinquencies of special affordable-housing loans with the longer-
term claim rates of standard loans with relaxed underwriting (Steinbach 1995). The analysis 
found that early delinquencies were twice as high for three percent down payments compared 
to five percent down payments, and that reducing down payments from ten to five percent 
doubled claim rates in the longer term (five to ten years). Conversely, a study of USDA loans 
for low-income rural households made through the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) 
found that those who generated sweat equity by building their own homes had a nearly 75 
percent reduction in the probability of monthly default (Quercia et al. 1995).  
Using a home-equity loan to borrow against a property can reduce the equity in the home. 
The level of borrowing through home-equity loans has been on the rise in recent years, both 
in the total dollar amount of loans and the size of each loan, and much of that increase has 
occurred in the subprime market (LaCour-Little 2004). One estimate put the home-equity 
market at $50 to 100 billion in the mid-1990s, compared to $525 to $700 billion by 2000 
(LaCour-Little 2004), an increase of about 800 percent. Since then, home-equity borrowing 
has continued to grow, with one estimate putting the increase from 2000 to 2001 at 19 per-
cent and from 2001 to 2002 at 22 percent, with growth expected to continue at approximately 
that pace (SMR Research 2003, 2004). Furthermore, the size of new home-equity loan com-
mitments increased by 44 percent from 2002 to 2003 alone, to an average of $58,054; 16 
percent of these loans went to subprime borrowers (American Banker 2003).  
Increasing housing prices is fueling much of the growth in home-equity borrowing. But as 
home prices have risen, so has consumer debt. The ratio of household debt payments (mort-
gage and consumer debt) to disposable income increased to a record high of 13.27 in the 
fourth quarter of 2001 and then dropped to 12.98 in the first quarter of 2004, a rate that is still 
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higher than anything seen prior to 2001 (Peterson 2004). Borrowing against one’s home, 
even as housing prices increase, may increase the chance of foreclosure. One study has found 
that housing appreciation may encourage home-equity borrowing and thereby actually in-
crease the risk of default (LaCour-Little 2004).  
Home-equity borrowing is not considered a factor in increasing the risk of foreclosure as 
long as the money is used for home improvement rather than for consumer spending. Home 
improvements should increase the value of the home and retain equity. When cash is taken 
out for other purposes, however, equity declines and the risk of default and foreclosure in-
creases. 
Trigger Events and Consumer Debt 
Research on the causes of mortgage default has also highlighted the importance of crisis 
events, sometimes called “trigger events,” in predicting default. An early study (Gardener 
and Mills 1989) found that personal financial circumstances, most frequently job loss or re-
duced income, were the causes of default in three-quarters of all cases examined. Other 
causes cited were divorce, illness or death, legal problems and catastrophes. Another study 
has shown that adverse shocks to house prices and income play a central role in mortgage 
default (Elmer and Seelig 1999). A more recent examination of delinquent borrowers also 
cited job or income loss as the primary event that cause a household to fall behind in mort-
gage payments, accounting for 39 percent of all delinquencies; other trigger events include 
illness or death (16 percent), excessive obligation (10 percent) and marital difficulties (9 per-
cent) (Cutts 2003).  
Low-income and minority households may be more likely to experience trigger events, par-
ticularly job loss. Job separation rates tend to be much higher in at least two industries — 
leisure and hospitality and construction — where lower-income workers are more likely to be 
represented than in other industries. In August 2004, the separation rate for all industries was 
3.1 percent, compared to 6.2 percent for the leisure and hospitality industry and 5.6 percent 
for construction (BLS 2004). Moreover, job displacement among African-Americans has 
risen sharply in recent years, from 4.2 percent in the1997 to 1999 period to 7.3 percent in the 
2001 to 2003 period, compared to an increase from 4.0 to 5.6 percent for white workers 
(Schmitt 2004).  
Property Location 
In addition to borrower characteristics, researchers have examined the characteristics of the 
neighborhoods in which properties are located. In much of the research, characteristics of the 
census tract in which the property is located, particularly minority composition and income, 
have been found to be more important in determining default rates than borrower characteris-
tics (Van Order and Zorn 2001). For example, one study found that default rates for 
properties in very-low-income census tracts are double those for very-low-income house-
holds (Van Order and Zorn 2000).  
Effective Community-Based Strategies for Preventing Foreclosures
 
8 
Another study of 22 metropolitan areas found that neighborhood effects on default persist 
even when taking into account individual borrower- and loan-related factors (Cotterman 
2001), and that neighborhood characteristics, particularly race and income, have effects on 
default rates that are separate and distinct from these same characteristics at the individual 
level. Cotterman suggests that earlier defaults may act as a trigger for later defaults, which 
may arise because defaults result in vacant properties or because they are one component of 
undesirable turnover in neighborhood homeownership. Analysis by Collins (2003) suggests 
that there is a “contagion” effect, demonstrating that foreclosures in some Chicago neighbor-
hoods have tended to cluster, positing that a number of geographically concentrated 
foreclosures may cause additional foreclosures in that area.  
Subprime Lending 
The influence of property location on default rates may be related to the rise of subprime 
lending, which tends to concentrate its lending activities in low-income and minority areas. 
Subprime lenders offer loans to generally less-creditworthy borrowers at a higher cost, 
through higher interest rates, higher closing costs, or both. Subprime lending and risk-based 
pricing have provided opportunities for less-creditworthy borrowers to purchase homes and 
to realize the benefits of homeownership.  
However, risks in mortgage lending are not necessarily properly priced, and the subprime 
industry may not be regulated for maximum benefit (Collins et al. 2004). One primary prob-
lem with the subprime market is the lax regulation of third-party brokers, the most common 
originators of subprime loans (Apgar et al. 2004). Third-party brokers are primarily con-
cerned with making loans, and not necessarily with assuring that the loans are viable or the 
best deal possible for the customer. In fact, Fannie Mae has estimated that as many as 35 to 
50 percent of all subprime borrowers could have qualified for lower-cost prime loans (Carr 
and Schuetz 2001).  
Subprime lenders also have been linked to predatory-lending practices (Bunce et al. 2001), 
when borrowers are victims of deception or outright fraud. While certainly not all subprime 
loans are predatory loans, both subprime and predatory loans charge interest rates that are 
higher than conventional rates and that require larger up-front payments. In addition, anecdo-
tal evidence is growing that a subset of subprime lenders are engaging in practices that strip 
borrowers of home equity, thereby placing them at greater risk of foreclosure (HUD/Treasury 
2000).  
The Growth of Subprime Lending 
Subprime lending has grown significantly in the past few years: while the volume of sub-
prime loans increased by 77 percent between 1996 and 2001, it jumped an additional 235 
percent in just the next two years, from $160 billion to $375 billion (Freddie Mac 2004). Ac-
cording to the national advocacy group ACORN, there were just over 100,000 subprime 
loans in 1993 compared to more than a million subprime loans in 2001 (ACORN 2002). 
About two-thirds of all subprime loans are refinances, and most involve taking cash out, thus 
reducing the home owner’s equity (Apgar et al. 2004). 
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Figure 1: Subprime Lending Activity in the U.S.: 1996–2003 (in billions of dollars) 
Source: Freddie Mac 2004. 
A number of recent studies that have examined subprime lending in selected cities and coun-
ties have demonstrated the rapid growth of the industry and its focus on low-income and 
minority neighborhoods. In the Atlanta metro area, loan originations by subprime lenders 
grew 150 percent between 1994 and 1998, compared to an overall growth in originations of 
111 percent; in very-low-income neighborhoods (where median household income is less 
than 50 percent of the metro area median), the growth rate was 440 percent, and in neighbor-
hoods with more than 50 percent minority population, the growth rate was 317 percent (Abt 
2000a). The growth of subprime lending in Boston was even greater during the same period: 
subprime loan originations grew by 435 percent compared to a total origination growth of 
119 percent; subprime lending grew 1,075 percent in very-low-income neighborhoods and 
1,005 percent in minority neighborhoods (Abt 2000b).  
Similar trends were found in Baltimore, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia (HUD 
2000a, HUD 2000b, HUD 2000c, Goldstein 2004). These studies consistently found that 
subprime loans were much more likely in low-income and minority neighborhoods than in 
upper-income and predominantly white neighborhoods. Further, the growth in subprime 
lending they cite occurred by 1998, prior to the large increases described above.  
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Table 1: Subprime Lending Characteristics in Baltimore, Los Angeles and Chicago, 
1993 and  1998
 
 
# of Subprime 
Refinance Loans 
1993 
# of Subprime 
Refinance Loans 
1998 
Percent Change 
1993–98 
Ratio of Loans in 
Lower-income to 
Upper-income 
Neighborhoods* 
Ratio of Loans in 
Black to White 
Neighborhoods** 
Baltimore 555 8,268 1,390% 7.4 to 1 6.1 to 1 
Los Angeles 9,351 25,384  171% 2.1 to 1 3.7 to 1 
Chicago 1,582 27,470 1,636% 6.2 to 1 6.0 to 1 
* Ratio of subprime refinance loans in predominantly low-income neighborhoods to similar loans in upper income neighbor-
hoods, 1998.  
** Ratio of subprime refinance loans in predominantly African-American neighborhoods to similar loans in predominantly white 
neighborhoods, 1998. 
Sources: HUD 2000a, HUD 2000b, Goldstein 2004. 
Subprime loans, particularly for refinance, are more likely to be made in low-income and mi-
nority neighborhoods. In 1998, subprime refinances accounted for 26 percent of refinance 
loans in low-income neighborhoods, compared to 11 percent in moderate-income neighbor-
hoods and 7 percent in upper-income neighborhoods (Bunce et al. 2001). As the studies cited 
above demonstrate, the differences are even more pronounced for predominantly African-
American neighborhoods compared to white neighborhoods. Racial differences persist even 
when income is factored in: while only 6 percent of homeowners in upper-income white 
neighborhoods used subprime lenders, 39 percent of homeowners in upper-income African-
American neighborhoods have used subprime refinancing, twice the rate of low-income 
white neighborhoods (Bunce et al. 2001).  
A report by the Center for Community Change also highlights the disparities in subprime 
lending between white and minority households (CCC 2002). Using 2000 data on mortgage 
originations, CCC found that lower-income African-American households received 2.4 times 
as many subprime loans as lower-income white households, while upper-income African-
American households received three times as many subprime loans as their white counter-
parts; the respective figures for Hispanic households were 1.4 and 2.2 (CCC 2002).  
Subprime Lending and Foreclosures 
Subprime loans are far more likely to be foreclosed upon than prime loans, and the recent 
increase in subprime foreclosures is staggering. The percentage of subprime loans going into 
foreclosure increased from a little over 3 percent in 1998 to more than 9 percent in 2002 be-
fore declining to about 7 percent in 2003; this compares to a foreclosure rate for prime loans 
over this period of about 0.5 percent (Apgar et al. 2004).  
The growth rate of subprime foreclosures has far outpaced the growth rate of prime foreclo-
sures. In the Atlanta metro area, subprime loan foreclosures increased 232 percent between 
1996 and 1999, while total foreclosures declined 7 percent (Abt 2000a). During the same pe-
riod, subprime foreclosures in the Boston metro area increased 255 percent while all 
foreclosures there declined 29 percent (Abt 2000b). For six counties in the Chicago area, 
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while total foreclosures increased 73 percent during that period, subprime foreclosures in-
creased by 476 percent (NTIC 2004). These subprime foreclosures, like subprime 
originations, are concentrated in minority and low-income neighborhoods (Bunce et al. 
2001).  
A number of studies have examined subprime lending and its relationship to foreclosures in 
selected cities and counties. A study done in Philadelphia found that subprime market pene-
tration was greatest in low- and moderate-income areas, and suggested that this was due to a 
constrained access to credit for minority and lower-income populations (Goldstein 2004). 
The study also found that subprime loans lead to a vastly disproportionate share of all fore-
closures, and that these foreclosures occur much more quickly than foreclosures on prime 
loans. In Baltimore, it was also found that subprime lending is more prevalent in lower-
income and minority neighborhoods and that the subprime share of foreclosures is highest in 
those neighborhoods as well (HUD 2000a).  
Time to Foreclosure for Subprime Loans 
Subprime loans also tend to foreclose more quickly than prime loans. In Philadelphia, 37.8 
percent of subprime loans closed within two years of origination in 2001, compared to only 
6.5 percent of prime loans (Goldstein 2004). Citing studies of the Atlanta, Boston and Chi-
cago metro areas, Bunce et al. (2001) found that most subprime loan foreclosures occurred 
within two years of origination. In Baltimore, HUD found that loans by subprime lenders 
were on average 1.8 years old at the time the foreclosure petition was filed (HUD 2000a). 
Such short time periods between origination and foreclosure suggest that these loans may not 
have been viable at the time they were made. The capacity to prevent delinquency from 
emerging is reduced, as there is much less time to identify and remedy the problem.  
Summary 
The likelihood of mortgage default increases as equity in the home declines, and default may 
be triggered by life events that affect income and debt, such as job loss, illness and divorce. 
Lack of equity can be the result of a low down payment, a loan against the home for con-
sumption expenses, or a decline in the value of the home; decline in home value may be due 
to declines in local housing values or to physical deterioration of the home. The effect of 
property location on the potential for default may be a consequence of the nature of the sub-
prime market. Foreclosure rates are higher in low-income and minority neighborhoods, the 
same types of neighborhoods where subprime lending is concentrated.  
Subprime and predatory lending often strip equity from a home and create repayment terms 
that are difficult or impossible for the homeowner to meet. Difficult repayment terms may be 
handled successfully with careful debt management practices, a restructuring of the debt or 
an increase in income. However, predatory, and even subprime, lending can put people into 
untenable financial situations, evidenced by the short time between origination and foreclo-
sure for many subprime loans. The primary incentive for mortgage brokers is to close the 
deal, so they may tend to be less concerned with the long-term performance of the loan; in 
fact, the mortgage origination system is not structured to ensure that borrowers get the best 
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terms for which they qualify (Apgar et al. 2004). Advances in mortgage underwriting and 
securitization allow lenders to originate higher-risk loans by charging more for the loan.  
However, lending risk is not borne solely by the lending institution, the investors or the 
mortgage insurer. Mortgage foreclosure also impacts the community in which the property is 
located. It is likely that there is some contagion effect whereby concentrated foreclosures 
cause additional foreclosures in the community, perhaps by affecting vacancy rates and hous-
ing prices. For communities in the midst of revitalization, whose housing markets may not be 
very stable, increased foreclosures can undo the positive effects of increased homeownership 
on neighborhood sustainability. The risk of default or foreclosure that lenders can take on 
when making loans may be greater than the amount of risk revitalizing neighborhoods can 
withstand. 
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Section II: Trends in Foreclosures 
Recent Trends in Foreclosures 
National foreclosure rates have been rising slowly over the past decade, as can be seen by the 
trend line in Figure 2. In addition, the national 90-day delinquency rate for single-family 
homes doubled, from 0.39 in 1999 to 0.78 in 2003 (Freddie Mac 2004).  
Figure 2: Rate of Foreclosures Started, 1993–2004, with Trend Line 
 
Source: Freddie Mac, Reporter’s Fact Book, 2004. 
National foreclosure rates mask what is happening in local markets, however. A number of 
states are seeing much higher foreclosure rates than the national average. Three states had 
foreclosure inventories more than twice the national rate: Ohio, Indiana and South Carolina 
(Table 2). These three states also had the highest rate of subprime foreclosures in inventory.  
Table 2: Rate of Foreclosure Inventory for All Loans 
and Subprime Loans, for Top 10 States and 
U.S. Overall, June 2004
 
 Foreclosures — 
All Loans 
Foreclosures — 
Subprime 
1. Ohio 3.33 11.57 
2. Indiana 2.78 9.58 
3. South Carolina 2.46 10.91 
4. Mississippi 2.27 8.67 
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5. Kentucky 2.00 9.05 
6. Pennsylvania 1.94 7.88 
7. Oklahoma 1.83 6.61 
8. Louisiana 1.73 6.81 
9. Michigan 1.65 7.62 
10. North Carolina 1.56 7.53 
U.S. Total 1.16 4.61 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association. 
Ohio and Indiana have seen rapid increases in their foreclosure rates in recent years. While 
foreclosure rates in those two states stayed below 1.5 percent during the 1990s, they reached 
nearly 3 percent in Indiana and 3.5 percent in Ohio by the 2000s. Foreclosure rates can be 
particularly high for smaller geographic areas (although the availability of data is limited). 
For example, the estimated foreclosure rate in Chicago reached 5.2 percent in 2002 before 
dropping back to 4.5 percent in 2003.1 The number of foreclosures in Chicago nearly dou-
bled between 1993 and 2002. More details on Chicago’s foreclosure problems are described 
in the case study below.  
Aside from the data cited above, some foreclosure trend data are available for three New 
York counties, New York City and three Ohio counties, described below. These data on fore-
closures cover different time periods and use differing measures, but are useful for examining 
trends in these selected areas. 
The three New York counties — Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester — were examined by Abt 
Associates in a study of subprime lending and foreclosures (Abt 2002). Analysis of foreclo-
sure auction sales from 1998 to 2001 in these three wealthy counties shows an increase both 
in subprime lending and in foreclosures, particularly in Suffolk and Westchester counties. 
The number of foreclosure sales increased 130 percent in Westchester, 113 percent in Suffolk 
and 35 percent in Nassau during the study period. The increase was particularly strong for 
subprime lenders, with subprime foreclosures increasing 285 percent, 174 percent and 47 
percent, respectively.  
In New York City, data from the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at New 
York University shows substantial increases in foreclosures in two of the three boroughs for 
which sufficient data were available. In the Bronx and Brooklyn, foreclosure rates increased 
45 and 43 percent, respectively, between 2000 and 2003, and increased 15 percent in Queens. 
More detail on foreclosures in New York City is provided in the case study below.  
Foreclosures in Ohio were examined for Lorain (outside Cleveland), Summit (including Ak-
ron) and Montgomery (including Dayton) counties and were compared to state levels 
(Bellamy 2002). Foreclosures in Ohio, the hardest-hit state, increased 98 percent between 
1997 and 2001, while foreclosures in these three counties increased 177 percent. Most of the 
increase came from subprime loans: there was a 333 percent increase in subprime foreclo-
sures compared to a 120 percent increase in prime loan foreclosures (Bellamy 2002).  
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Section III: Community and Industry Responses to Foreclosures  
In response to the growth of foreclosures, many community-based development organiza-
tions are establishing foreclosure-prevention and -intervention programs. While their primary 
concern is with the impact foreclosures may have on their community revitalization efforts, 
they also seek to sustain the gains in affordable homeownership that have been realized in 
recent years. Thus, while some CBDOs focus their foreclosure-prevention programs on tar-
geted neighborhoods and clients whom they have helped get into homes, others accept 
applicants from wider geographic areas. 
NWA has described a number of foreclosure-prevention programs among members of its 
NeighborWorks® network in its Winning Strategies database, available at 
www.nw2.org/WinningStrategies/search.asp.  
It is useful to examine a number of these programs and consider what practices have made 
them successful. In addition to these descriptions, two in-depth case studies of foreclosure 
problems and foreclosure-prevention programs in Chicago and New York also help to illus-
trate how community-based responses have developed.  
Neighborhood Housing Services of Boise 
NHS Boise was established in 1982 to focus revitalization efforts on one Boise neighbor-
hood; it has since grown into a multifaceted housing and social-service agency that offers 
many services statewide. As a NeighborWorks Full-Cycle Lender®, it provides both pre- and 
postpurchase counseling and housing and rehabilitation finance. It has developed more than 
250 units of affordable rental property and 80 units for ownership. Annually, NHS Boise’s 
homeownership programs help more than 300 households and leverage about $35 million 
with its first and second mortgages.  
In 2002, NHS Boise established its foreclosure-prevention program in response to the eight 
to ten calls per month it was receiving from homeowners in danger of foreclosure. NHS 
Boise staff contacted local real estate agents and lending institutions to have them refer to the 
program homeowners who had gotten behind in their mortgage payments. With a grant from 
NWA, NHS Boise set up a program that includes an oversight committee, one-on-one coun-
seling, loan funds and a marketing effort.  
A subcommittee of NHS Boise’s loan committee has developed guidelines for its foreclo-
sure-prevention lending, with the committee determining who among the many applicants 
meets these strict lending criteria. The funds are available only to borrowers who can demon-
strate that they are capable of repaying the loans and getting their mortgage payments back 
on schedule. The borrowers cannot have had a bankruptcy, and their delinquency must be 
due to some event outside their control, such as job loss or a medical emergency. They must 
be employed, earning less than 120 percent of the area median income, and demonstrate a 
strong desire to stay in their home. Loans from $1,500 to $5,000 are available at a four per-
cent interest rate and a term that ranges from five to 15 years. The term of the loan is 
determined by capping the back-end debt ratio at 45 percent. Funds may only be used to pay 
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off other debts once the mortgage is brought current. In addition, the first payment of the 
NHS loan may be deferred if the borrower requires more time.  
The foreclosure-prevention program is available to homeowners throughout the state, but 
NHS Boise does not market it, for two reasons. First, the organization receives enough calls 
from those in danger of foreclosure as a HUD-approved housing counseling agency; it has 
also supplied local lenders with information about its program and receives a number of re-
ferrals from its lending partners and local real estate agents. As there have been major layoffs 
at some of the larger employers in the Boise area, the organization is now receiving 15 to 20 
inquiries per week. Second, its foreclosure-prevention activities are costly and use a great 
deal of staff time. Each loan requires an average of nine hours of counselor time and costs 
NHS an average of $906.  
NHS Boise has closed nine loans, averaging $4,400 per loan. The borrowers who received 
these loans had all experienced job loss, but all were rapidly able to become current again on 
their mortgages because of the loan. The organization plans to close six to eight loans a year 
and has projected a cost of $7,248 to operate the program. The program will require about 
$40,000 in capital. However, the net savings from preventing each foreclosure is estimated at 
approximately $25,000, and the value to the family is inestimable.  
NHS Boise has learned that working with borrowers who are more than 60 days past due on 
their loans is extremely difficult. Getting the lender to be patient with these loans requires 
providing a clear explanation of the program and assurance that the process moves along 
quickly. That is why the NHS staff have been given the authority to approve the loans di-
rectly rather than taking the time to get the loan committee to approve them. It is necessary to 
make fast decisions regarding loan approvals in foreclosure cases.  
The program must necessarily be limited in scope, as the available funds can be depleted 
quickly in a poorly performing economy. The limit on loan size not only helps to keep the 
loan fund intact, but also forces the borrowers to make managing their finances a top priority. 
The loan limit also makes it possible to help more people.  
Neighborhood Housing Services of Cleveland 
One of the first Neighborhood Housing Services, NHS Cleveland has been in operation for 
more than 25 years and provides its NeighborWorks® Full-Cycle Lending services to the en-
tire city. Its foreclosure-prevention program has been in existence five years and has been 
integrated into the organization’s postpurchase counseling program. NHS of Cleveland found 
that recruiting participants for its postpurchase counseling program was difficult, but that 
adding the incentive of offering foreclosure-prevention loans only to those homebuyers who 
participated in postpurchase counseling made the program more attractive.  
The postpurchase counseling program provides information on managing finances, making 
mortgage payments on time, homeowner insurance, preventative maintenance and foreclo-
sure prevention. The foreclosure-prevention material includes steps homeowners should take 
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if they are hit with financial hardship, and potential workout options such as loan modifica-
tions and preforeclosure sales. The counseling programs are free. 
Foreclosure-prevention loans are available for city residents whose income does not exceed 
115 percent of the area median income and who are members of the NHS Homebuyers Club. 
The maximum loan is $2,500 and is provided at market rate for three to 60 months. The loan 
is secured as a subordinate mortgage. The borrower is charged $300 for document prepara-
tion and administrative services, and is required to attend the postpurchase education classes 
described above.  
The program is not advertised. While NHS of Cleveland receives referrals from Homebuyers 
Club participants, it believes that a more extensive marketing effort would result in more ap-
plications than the program could support. The concept behind this policy is that foreclosure-
prevention loans often are not needed if homeowners have sufficient postpurchase counseling 
and education. As evidence of the validity of this concept, only two foreclosure-prevention 
loans have had to be made.  
Colorado Housing Counseling Coalition 
The Colorado Housing Counseling Coalition is a coalition of housing counseling profession-
als who promote affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families through the 
sharing of knowledge, resources and counseling techniques among its members. Founded in 
1980, CHCC provides prepurchase counseling, consumer education, debt management, re-
verse equity mortgage counseling and foreclosure-prevention counseling. Member 
organizations are located throughout Colorado and include a number of housing authorities, 
consumer credit counseling agencies and other nonprofit organizations. 
CHCC also brings housing counselors and lenders together to identify and discuss emerging 
issues in housing counseling. The coalition then develops and provides training on these is-
sues for counselors and lenders. “Having the counselors and lenders go through the training 
together helps them to understand the loss-mitigation process from each other’s perspective 
and helps them work together better,” says CHCC President Leslie Swanberg-Elliston. 
The Denver area saw a 26 percent increase in the rate of foreclosures between 2003 and 
2004. These foreclosures are concentrated in high-proportion minority areas, where subprime 
lending has also been concentrated. Since 1998, more than half of Denver foreclosures have 
occurred in just one-fifth of its neighborhoods. Nearly all of these neighborhoods has a larger 
percentage of minority residents than the city as a whole.  
CHCC members respond to households at risk of foreclosure by applying whatever resources 
their particular organization has to offer, or by referring households to other members if nec-
essary. For example, the Colorado Housing Assistance Corporation (CHAC) provides second 
mortgages of up to $4,700 to at-risk homeowners in the city and county of Denver who have 
lived in their homes at least three years and have dealt with whatever problem got them into 
arrears on their mortgage. It requires that the homeowners go through a counseling program; 
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although CHAC has a counseling capacity, it sends clients who need a second mortgage to 
another member of the coalition for counseling. 
Another coalition member, Brothers Redevelopment Incorporated, provides a wide variety of 
housing services, with a strong emphasis on serving senior citizens and the disabled. For 
more than 30 years, BRI has provided free home-maintenance and renovation services, utiliz-
ing a significant force of volunteer labor. Its last annual “Paint-a-thon” had more than 1,000 
volunteers paint 114 homes in eight Colorado cities. BRI also provides reverse mortgages for 
seniors in need of money. Each year, BRI provides default mortgage counseling to about 200 
people, reverse mortgage counseling to more than 350 people, and first-time homebuyer 
counseling to about 240 people.  
Neighborhood Housing Services of Hamilton, Ohio 
Hamilton, Ohio is another American city that has seen significant job losses in recent years, 
with many local employers going out of business or relocating. NHS of Hamilton, a chartered 
member of the NeighborWorks® network, has served its community for eight years and has 
provided $30 million to housing development and lending. Initially focusing on home-
maintenance lending and training, NHS of Hamilton has expanded its services to become a 
NW Full-Cycle Lender® that provides first mortgages.  
NHS of Hamilton decided to supplement its pre- and postpurchase counseling and its training 
on preventative maintenance with a program, the Rescue Program, for early-intervention as-
sistance for homeowners experiencing financial difficulties. The Rescue Program is available 
to Hamilton homeowners who have fallen behind in their mortgage payments due to illness 
or job loss, or who are unable to afford emergency home repairs. The primary qualifying fac-
tor for a Rescue Program loan is to be in a financial crisis; there are no income limitations. 
The applicant receives a credit and income review if NHS staff believe the homeowner can 
repair his or her financial situation and return to making mortgage payments and maintaining 
the property. Staff will not make the loan, however, if the applicant has high debt levels and 
excessive delinquencies and will lose the home regardless of a loan.  
Homeowners behind on their mortgage can receive up to four months of payments to bring 
the loan current through a second mortgage on the property. NHS will also provide funds to 
fix maintenance emergencies, such as a leaky roof or broken furnace. The homeowner has 
the option of paying the loan back in installments or deferring loan payments, paying back 
the loan in full when the house is sold or the owner passes away.  
The Minnesota Home Ownership Center 
The Family Housing Fund of Minneapolis/Saint Paul established its Mortgage Foreclosure 
and Prevention Program (MFPP) in 1991, and turned over administration of the program to 
the Home Ownership Center in 1999. HOC is a nonprofit, intermediary organization dedi-
cated to helping Minnesotans with low and moderate incomes to purchase and maintain 
homes. It works with a network of community-based organizations to develop high-quality 
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homeownership education, loan counseling and support for potential and existing home-
owners.  
HOC delivers its foreclosure-prevention services through a partnership of three community 
organizations: Northside Residents Development Council, Twin Cities Habitat for Humanity, 
and Saint Paul’s Department of Planning and Economic Development. In-depth counseling 
on financial and personal issues, intervention and advocacy with mortgage servicers and 
lenders, referrals to community services and assistance in accessing funds are provided to 
homeowners at risk of losing their homes.  
MFPP can provide no-interest loans as emergency financial assistance to help homeowners 
become current on their mortgages. HOC manages the fund, but the three MFPP partners can 
approve loans based on a set of criteria designed to sustain homeownership in the long term. 
These criteria include that: (1) the financial problem is a result of circumstances beyond the 
borrower’s control, such as job loss or medical emergency; (2) the financial situation is solv-
able and the borrower is willing to work with program staff; and (3) the borrower must be at 
least 60 days behind in mortgage payments (Quercia et al. 2004). 
MFPP has served more than 8,000 households since 1991, with about half receiving informa-
tion and referrals only and half receiving intensive case management, counseling and/or 
financial assistance. A study of this program has estimated that the program has prevented 
1,756 foreclosures as of June 30, 2003 (Quercia et al. 2004). This study has also identified a 
number of trends in the program:  
!"In recent years, the proportion of households receiving information and referrals only 
has increased relative to the proportion receiving more intensive assistance; 
!"The percentage of unemployed borrowers increased to 13.5 percent in the first half of 
2003 from 9.1 percent during 2002;  
!"The proportion of nonwhite borrowers increased to 68.5 percent in the first half of 
2003, from about 54 percent in 2001 through 2002;  
!"The average number of years a property was owned before the owner entered the pro-
gram increased from 5.2 in 2001 to 7.1 in the first half of 2003.  
The program is becoming increasingly successful in preventing foreclosures, with the per-
centage of clients going to foreclosure decreasing from 4.7 percent in 2001 to 2.4 percent in 
the first half of 2003, a level much lower than that for the life of the program (1991-2003), 
which is 7.6 percent (Quercia et al. 2004). The study also found that the number going 
through a loan restructuring or modification increased from 4.2 percent in 2001 to 8.0 percent 
in 2003. Furthermore, the length of time to resolution has decreased from an average of 281 
days to 205 days. Overall, the study of the MFPP found that community-based foreclosure-
prevention programs are cost effective.  
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Home Ownership Matters LLC of Indianapolis 
Home Ownership Matters (HOM) is the creation of Mildred Wilkins, a real estate profes-
sional and former Fannie Mae foreclosure specialist who sold foreclosed properties. Seeing 
the rise of foreclosures in Indiana, she decided to take action. Many new homebuyers were 
caught unaware by the details in their no-down-payment mortgage agreements. For example, 
a practice known as “2-1 buy down” means that homeowners can obtain an initial interest 
rate two percent below the current market rate. This “teaser rate” increases by one percent at 
the end of the first year and by another one percent at the end of the second year. In addition, 
property taxes are not assessed for 12 to 18 months after owners have moved in, which re-
sults in a dramatically increased tax bill when it is assessed. These two factors mean that 
owners’ house payment during the 2nd and 3rd years may be as much as 35 to 40 percent 
higher than the day they closed. These practices, along with unprecedented job loss and a 
downturn in the Indiana economy, have contributed to three in ten new homes in some sub-
divisions ending up in a sheriff’s sale.  
HOM was established in 2002 to help consumers become more knowledgeable about home-
ownership. HOM provides training programs to reach both consumers and real estate 
professionals who may have contact with borrowers who are at risk of defaulting on their 
mortgages. Many real estate professionals have not received in-depth training in loss-
mitigation practices, such as restructuring the mortgage after payments have become delin-
quent. Consumers are also generally unaware of loss-mitigation options and do not know 
what alternatives to foreclosure they have.  
HOM training sessions for real estate professionals, Practical Application of Loss Mitigation 
(PALM), are targeted to housing counselors, attorneys, community development corporation 
staff and consumer credit agency staff. In addition, short-sale training for real estate agents is 
designed to help them become familiar with the process required by lenders to sell the house 
for less than the mortgage, as a way for a consumer who is in default to avoid foreclosure. 
HOM has also provided free sessions on homeownership education that target senior citizens, 
at senior centers, libraries and homeownership fairs. Through a recent partnership with Na-
tional City Bank of Indiana, HOM will expand its counseling and education efforts for 
seniors and for new and prospective homebuyers.  
“This strategic partnership allows me to achieve the goals and founding mission of HOM, 
which is to educate, empower and encourage consumers to sustain homeownership, particu-
larly at a time when Indiana is experiencing such high foreclosure rates,” says HOM 
President Mildred Wilkins.  
Nuestra Comunidad Development Corporation 
Nuestra Comunidad was founded in 1981 to serve the Dudley neighborhood of Roxbury, 
Massachusetts. The organization builds housing and commercial properties, provides small 
business loans, conducts homeownership education classes and provides job and anti-drug 
abuse services to the youth of Dudley.  
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As in many other low-income communities, predatory-lending practices were leading to a 
high number of foreclosures. Recognizing the need to assure that its homeownership efforts 
were sustainable, Nuestra Comunidad started a program to help homeowners in financial 
trouble to keep their homes from going into foreclosure. When a person threatened by fore-
closure approaches the organization, a foreclosure counselor acts to: 
!"Explore the reasons for the financial difficulties; 
!"Structure a payment plan that fits the owner’s circumstances; 
!"Contact the lender, explaining the circumstances and emphasizing that the owner is 
working with Nuestra Comunidad to remedy the situation;  
!"Work with the lender to modify or refinance the loan, perhaps extending the term or 
reducing the rate. 
Nuestra Comunidad has worked out 27 foreclosure cases, helping to keep many families in 
their homes. It has also approved ten home-improvement second mortgages, provided credit 
counseling to more than 100 people, and provided budgeting and financial-literacy counsel-
ing to 140 households.  
Nuestra Comunidad has learned that many homeowners do not know they can negotiate with 
lenders without resorting to foreclosure. Because homeowners in danger of foreclosure may 
not seek out help, it is necessary to reach out to homeowners and make them aware of coun-
seling services that are available. Nuestra Comunidad also focuses its efforts on working with 
lenders, rather than servicers or attorneys, because the lender has a greater incentive to keep 
the property from foreclosure. 
NeighborWorks® of Western Vermont 
NeighborWorks® of Western Vermont was founded in 1985 to address the housing needs of 
four neighborhoods in the small town of Rutland, but has since expanded to serve three Ver-
mont counties. It has loaned approximately $5 million to nearly 400 homeowners to make 
needed housing repairs and has provided access to grants and loans for housing rehabilita-
tion, weatherization, handicap access and lead paint abatement from other agencies. It also 
provides grants and loans for emergency shelter for families facing homelessness.  
NeighborWorks® of Western Vermont promotes homeownership, holding monthly Home-
buyer Education classes that have helped more than 350 households understand the 
purchasing process. It also has loaned $3.75 million for affordable homeownership to 331 
local families, leveraging an additional $24 million from lenders.  
The prolonged recession in New England has impacted homeowners in Vermont, with fore-
closures often coming as a result of family difficulties, unemployment, and income or life 
skills problems. The connection that NeighborWorks® of Western Vermont has made be-
tween the economy and homeownership has helped it acquire the support it needs to make 
the program a success. This NHS discovered that foreclosure intervention could not be ac-
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complished by one agency, but required multiple organizations that could work together and 
be willing to contribute something to the effort. 
The organization focuses its foreclosure-prevention efforts on educating homebuyers in pre-
purchase counseling sessions about the importance of staying current on their mortgage and 
what to do if financial calamity strikes. Part of the eight-hour prepurchase educating informs 
participants about how people can get behind on their mortgages and who to contact if they 
have trouble. In addition, the participants sign an agreement that allows the loan servicer to 
contact NeighborWorks® of Western Vermont if the borrower does get behind in payments. 
The agreement is part of a larger program that the NHS has formed with the Vermont Hous-
ing Finance Agency which helps to assure the long-term viability of homeownership. 
“We want to build a relationship with the homeowner that lasts beyond the purchase,” says 
Housing Counselor Deborah Wing. “We want them to know we are a long-term resource for 
them.” 
NeighborWorks® of Western Vermont can also provide some funds or financial counseling in 
the case of an emergency. Often emergencies involve rural, elderly clients who contact the 
NHS because they need emergency repairs. The organization can access the Emergency 
Shelter Fund to provide grants to cover short-term housing expenses, but these funds are very 
limited. Most of the people in these situations are referrals, not NHS clients. Deborah Wing 
believes that the prepurchase preparation that is provided keeps their own clients from having 
to access these services.  
Neighborhood of Affordable Housing, East Boston 
Neighborhood of Affordable Housing in East Boston is a community development corpora-
tion that began operations in 1987 and serves culturally diverse neighborhoods throughout 
the Boston area. NOAH provides first and second mortgages and refinancing loans, and sup-
plements lending with home repair assistance, financial education and homeownership 
counseling. It also improves green space and schoolyards, provides youth activist and em-
ployment training, and manages affordable rental properties. 
This organization has taken a different approach to the foreclosures that plague their commu-
nity. NOAH has developed an efficient method for getting troubled properties back on the 
market quickly, avoiding the problem of foreclosed homes becoming abandoned properties 
that can bring down neighborhood housing values.  
In 2001, NOAH began to focus on homeownership promotion as a strategy for stabilizing the 
East Boston neighborhood, an area near Logan International Airport. The housing market 
there had been hot in the 1980s, but went into a downturn that caused many homes to go into 
foreclosure, threatening NOAH’s stabilization efforts. NOAH first tried to buy and rehabili-
tate the worst properties, but found such an approach required substantial subsidies. The 
organization then used purchase-rehabilitation financing to help families buy homes and do 
their own rehabilitation, but this process was too difficult for first-time homebuyers. In order 
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to reach sufficient scale, NOAH needed to focus on properties that needed little repair and 
could be bought at discounted prices. 
NOAH reached an agreement with Fannie Mae to acquire its foreclosed properties at a 15 
percent discount off regular market prices. It obtained access to properties early in the fore-
closure process in order to perform inspection, spec preparation and cost estimation. If the 
property was viable, NOAH took title immediately after Fannie Mae took it into its inven-
tory. NOAH used pre-arranged financing with Bank of Boston that provided a loan of up to 
95 percent of value and allowed a one-time assumption of the mortgage. Thus, the buyer 
could make a five percent down payment to NOAH and assume the mortgage. Most buyers 
were in the 65 to 80 percent range of median area income.  
An Examination of Community Foreclosure-Prevention Programs 
A recent study of postpurchase programs by Baker (2004) includes an examination of suc-
cessful foreclosure-prevention practices. This insightful analysis describes the key 
components of a foreclosure-prevention program and the various levels of effort that can be 
undertaken, based upon the resources available.  
Baker also points out some of the challenges to creating a successful program:  
!"The need to coordinate a wide range of services, some of which may have to come 
from a number of partner organizations; 
!"An ability to work with a broad range of clients;  
!"The need for expertise in areas such as loss-mitigation techniques, alternative mort-
gage financing and legal issues related to predatory lending and bankruptcy.  
The key to keeping a mortgage from going into foreclosure is to address the problem early. 
This, in turn, makes the marketing of services and outreach to potential clients an important 
component of a successful program. However, a community organization can quickly be 
overwhelmed by clients. Any organization that decides to take on foreclosure prevention 
needs to determine the level of effort that its resources will allow.  
Baker’s analysis describes seven levels of service a foreclosure-prevention program can pro-
vide, from the most basic, Level 1, to the most sophisticated, Level 7. Level 1 service is 
defined as providing counseling services to one’s own clients, with limited phone services 
and referrals available to other clients. Level 2 services include making available refinancing 
and home-equity loans for one’s own clients. Levels 3-7 involve providing services to the 
general public. Each level involves the provision of more complex services, such as debt 
management and predatory-lending counseling. The more advanced levels require having the 
capacity for electronic collection and transfer of debt payments. 
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Figure 3: Key Components of Foreclosure-Intervention Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Source: Baker, Christi (2004).  
Baker lists seven key components for a foreclosure-prevention program. The first component 
is community and industry outreach, in order to get to clients as early as possible. The 
amount of outreach depends upon the level of service the program will provide, particularly 
whether it will serve clients from the general public. Successful organizations often also set 
up early delinquency notification agreements with servicers.  
The second component is client intake and problem assessment. Baker states that because 
clients are often reluctant to make contact with a service provider, the agency must make its 
services easily available and reassure the homeowner that they are there to help. It is crucial 
that in the initial contact with the homeowner, the counselor is friendly and supportive. The 
counselor should also determine the following: (1) the length of delinquency; (2) the client’s 
desire to stay in the home; (3) the circumstances surrounding the delinquency; (4) the ability 
of the homeowner to become current with the loan; (5) the owner’s willingness to work with 
a counselor; (6) whether predatory lending may be involved.  
The third component is financial counseling that is aimed at helping the homeowner achieve 
a long-term sustainable solution to the problem. Baker finds that good budget counseling 
alone in many cases can help borrowers recover from delinquency. Clients may need to be 
referred to debt-management counseling if credit card debt is significant.  
The fourth component of a foreclosure-prevention program includes much more resource-
intensive and sophisticated forms of assistance, such as legal assistance, particularly if preda-
tory lending is involved; financial assistance, such as bridge loans or grants; and other types 
of counseling services which may include job or family counseling, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the delinquency.  
The fifth component involves negotiations with the loan servicers. Baker states that this can 
be a staff-intensive activity but nearly always brings quicker results for the borrower. Work-
ing with servicers is important because they will see that the borrower is interested in curing 
the delinquency and has assistance from an agency to ensure success. It is also extremely im-
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portant to have consistent contacts with loan servicers who have the authority to approve loss 
mitigation options, in order to assure that the process is handled expediently. 
Refinancing assistance and education is the sixth component. The borrower may need access 
to reduced interest rates, better loan terms or funds to cure the delinquency. Having a lending 
capacity, or access to it, strengthens the foreclosure-prevention program. An expedited proc-
ess for providing financing also helps to assure that the delinquent loan is cured successfully, 
particularly in cases where predatory lending is involved. In addition, because homeowners 
are flooded with offers to refinance or take out home-equity loans, refinancing education can 
help guide them to safe financing options.  
The seventh component involves evaluating the effectiveness of the foreclosure-prevention 
program. Baker emphasizes the importance of agencies tracking their clients’ progress to de-
termine if they are successful on both a short- and long-term basis, perhaps for as long as 
three years after assistance is provided. Although evaluation uses valuable resources, this 
component assures staff that their efforts are effective and provides evidence for the factors 
that contribute to program success.  
The nature of the staffing of a foreclosure-prevention program is a vital concern. Staffing 
needs depend upon the level of services to be provided. Baker estimates that, on average, 
foreclosure-intervention counselors can work with four to six clients per day. In general, staff 
require the following: lending experience, including knowledge of home-rehabilitation and 
refinance lending; knowledge of loss-mitigation procedures; and personal counseling skills. 
Foreclosure-prevention counselors need to be able to negotiate with lending institutions and, 
potentially, even bring pressure on lenders. Their work can be facilitated by understanding 
servicer policies and procedures. When interacting with their clients, counselors also must be 
able to be tough and supportive at the same time. 
Summary  
While community-based foreclosure-prevention programs vary from place to place according 
to local circumstances and resources, a number of components are necessary at a minimum. 
First, outreach to potential clients is important because of the short time to foreclosure for 
many loans and the reduction in costs that comes from addressing a default early. The 
amount of outreach must be balanced with available resources, however, as foreclosure pre-
vention is a staff-intensive process, and an organization can quickly be overwhelmed with 
requests for assistance. Second, negotiation with lenders and homeowners is crucial to suc-
cess, although it can be challenging to agency staff. Foreclosure-prevention staff must 
understand the loan and loss-mitigation processes, be familiar with the lending institutions’ 
policies and procedures, and be skilled at personal counseling. Moreover, the most successful 
programs provide a variety of services that generally interact, which may include budget 
counseling, job and family counseling, loan products or access to loans, and financial educa-
tion.  
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Section IV: Case Studies: Foreclosures in Chicago  
and New York City 
Foreclosures have affected community development activities in a number of cities across the 
country and, as seen above, local organizations have implemented a variety of strategies and 
programs to combat the ill effects of increased foreclosures on the neighborhoods they serve. 
The NHSs of Chicago and New York City stand out in their response to the problem, how-
ever, implementing multifaceted and comprehensive programs. While not all communities 
have the resources of these two large cities, an in-depth examination of their foreclosure-
prevention programs will help demonstrate the possibilities for an effective community-based 
response to rising foreclosure rates. 
Preserving Homeownership in NHS of Chicago’s Targeted Neighborhoods  
Established in 1975, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago currently targets its revi-
talization efforts toward nine neighborhoods with a combined population of a little more than 
half a million. NHS of Chicago provides homeownership education and counseling; mort-
gage, refinance and home-improvement loans; construction oversight; loan counseling; and 
foreclosure intervention. Its Redevelopment Corporation supports neighborhood revitaliza-
tion efforts by acquiring and renovating high-quality affordable housing. In 2001, it helped 
2,500 homebuyers and supported the renovation of more than 300 housing units. NHS of 
Chicago focuses its programs and services on nine key neighborhoods in the city: Auburn-
Gresham/Englewood, Back of the Yards, Chicago Lawn/Gage Park, Garfield Boulevard, 
North Lawndale, Roseland, South Chicago, West Englewood and West Humboldt.  
Foreclosures on the Rise 
While these neighborhoods account for just 18 percent of Chicago’s population and five per-
cent of all mortgage originations in 2001, they experienced 41 percent of the city’s foreclo-
sures (Apgar et al. 2004). These nine neighborhoods had a 2001 foreclosure rate of 7.7 per-
cent, compared to 4.7 percent for the city and 1.15 percent for the nation overall (Collins 
2003). One of the neighborhoods had a foreclosure rate of 30 percent.  
The rate of foreclosures and the speed with which they occur have been increasing substan-
tially (Collins 2003). Between 1993 and 2001, the number of foreclosures in the nine target 
neighborhoods increased 73 percent, and in four of them the number of foreclosures more 
than doubled. Furthermore, more than half of the loans foreclosed on in 2001 were less than 
three years old, while in 1993 less than 15 percent of foreclosed loans were that age. (Figure 
4, following page.) 
As a share of all properties, foreclosures are becoming dangerously high in several of these 
neighborhoods. Back of the Yards, in particular, with 11 percent of its properties having ex-
perienced foreclosures, is seeing a foreclosure rate that will likely create significant blight 
from abandoned properties. More than half of these neighborhoods are seeing foreclosures on 
property that are more than double the citywide rate. (Figure 5, following page.)
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Figure 4: Foreclosures Started, NHS of Chicago Targeted Areas, 1993 and 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Collins, J. Michael, PolicyLab Consulting, LLC, presentation to 
 HOPI Partnership meeting at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, July 2004. 
 
Figure 5: Foreclosure Starts as a Share of All Properties, NHS of Chicago, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Collins, J. Michael, PolicyLab Consulting, LLC, presentation to 
 HOPI Partnership meeting at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, July 2004. 
Effective Community-Based Strategies for Preventing Foreclosures
 
28 
Subprime Lending and Foreclosures 
The increase in foreclosures is due, in large measure, to the increase in subprime lending. 
The number of Chicago subprime foreclosures increased by 223 percent from 1997 to 2003, 
while prime foreclosures declined by 20 percent (NTIC 2004). The number of subprime fore-
closures was more than twice the number of prime foreclosures in 2003, with 2,894 subprime 
foreclosures compared to 1,268 prime foreclosures (NTIC 2004).  
Subprime lending has been focused on neighborhoods that, like the neighborhoods served by 
NHS of Chicago, are predominantly African-American. The nine neighborhoods NHS of 
Chicago targets are 94 percent African-American. ACORN analyzed subprime lending by 
race for the largest metro areas in 2001 and estimated the disparity in the subprime market 
between whites and African-Americans (ACORN 2002). The Chicago metro area ranked in 
the top ten of 67 metro areas in racial disparity, for both refinance and home-purchase lend-
ing. The analysis showed that African-Americans in the Chicago metro area were 7.3 times 
as likely to use a subprime lender for refinancing as were whites and 7.1 times as likely to 
use a subprime lender for home purchase. Given that 62 percent of African-Americans in the 
Chicago metro area live in the City of Chicago, it is likely that most of these loans were 
made within the city boundaries. The ACORN findings echo the findings of an earlier report 
that found subprime loans were eight times more likely in predominantly black neighbor-
hoods of the Chicago metro area than in predominantly white neighborhoods (HUD 2000b).  
The NHS of Chicago Response to Increased Foreclosures 
Facing up to these grim figures, NHS of Chicago and the city of Chicago launched a cam-
paign to combat foreclosure. The mayor and the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago convened a group of civic leaders to create the Home Ownership Preservation Initia-
tive (HOPI). HOPI’s goals are as follows: 
!"Help 1,500 homeowners in danger of foreclosure to keep their homes, using loss-loan 
workouts, refinancing and emergency loans to bring homeowners current; 
!"Reclaim 300 foreclosed properties as neighborhood assets and turn them into home-
ownership opportunities; and 
!"Document lessons learned about what are the best practices in homeownership and 
property preservation. 
The program includes creating partnerships with local lending institutions, making financial 
assistance available and providing an array of counseling services. The partnerships and loan 
and counseling services are described separately, but are generally used in combination in 
order to keep homeowners from foreclosure.  
HOPI Partnerships 
One of HOPI’s primary strategies is to work with local subprime lenders on the issues that 
contribute to default and foreclosure. Much of the discussion between the partners is based 
on a recent report released by NHS of Chicago that describes subprime lending and foreclo-
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sure: Preserving Home Ownership: Community-Development Implications of the New 
Mortgage Market. The partnership has created working groups focusing on these areas: 
!"Loss mitigation: Outreach to troubled borrowers to get them into a foreclosure-
prevention program as quickly as possible; 
!"REOs: Taking foreclosed properties (called “real estate owned” or REO) and getting 
the lender to sell them at discount so that they can be resold (NHS of Chicago has 
purchased and rehabilitated more than 100 units in two target neighborhoods as part 
of a national pilot program with HUD); and 
!"Prevention in origination: Developing the best practices for loan originations to en-
sure that the loan is structured for the borrower to succeed. 
NHS of Chicago has established excellent working relationships with local lenders and can 
negotiate for temporarily reduced interest rates on loans and other methods for helping 
homeowners become current on their payments. The organization has developed these rela-
tionships based on mutual trust and respect, and works tirelessly on behalf of the homeowner. 
“You must have open and honest communication with the lenders to make the process suc-
cessful. They can turn our requests down but will always come back and try on the next deal. 
We are good at taking rejection,” says Irma Morales, Director of New Lending Partnerships 
and Alliances at NHS of Chicago. 
Financial Assistance 
NHS of Chicago also helped to bring into existence a loan pool to help families in danger of 
foreclosure, the Neighborhood Ownership Recovery Mortgage Assistance Loan (NORMAL). 
NORMAL was created in 1999 by a task force of local lenders, city officials, housing advo-
cates and NHS staff. The task force developed policies and procedures for the loan product, 
set underwriting guidelines and put together a loan committee of representatives from the 
lending institutions that invested in the fund. NHS of Chicago created a loan-participation 
pool and offered shares to lenders at $100,000 per share. Eighteen institutions participated in 
22 shares, creating a $2.2 million fund.  
Once a client in need of assistance has been identified, NHS staff work with the homeowner 
to help him or her qualify for conventional refinancing. Often with the help of the Legal As-
sistance Foundation, NHS of Chicago then negotiates with the lender or servicer to reduce 
the mortgage amount and prevent the loss of ownership. The NORMAL loan is used to refi-
nance the first mortgage. The refinanced mortgage must be negotiated to a reduced payoff, 
and cannot be used to repay other revolving or installment debt. The loans are for refinancing 
predatory loans, rehabilitating a property or carrying out foreclosure intervention. The bor-
rowers must be owner-occupants who in order to qualify must have adequate disposable 
income to repay the loan and good credit histories. Borrowers are also expected to contribute 
their own funds to the transaction. 
The loans are fully amortizing, at the rate of the Fannie Mae 60-day rate plus 50 basis points. 
The loan amount cannot exceed Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac maximums and the loan-to-
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value and combined loan-to-value limits must meet NeighborWorks® standards. Closing 
costs include a limited loan origination fee, which can be financed. NHS of Chicago then 
services the loan. 
Fifteen NORMAL loans have been approved at an average amount of nearly $70,000. Ten of 
the loans prevented impending foreclosures and resulted in mortgage reductions of $5,000 to 
$45,000. Participation in the program has helped NHS of Chicago to expand its partnerships 
with local lenders and create new relationships. 
In addition to NORMAL, the HOPI initiative leverages funds from the city of Chicago. The 
city has forgivable loans for lower-income households that need maintenance and repairs 
done on their properties. Often homeowners acquire expensive loans to cover home repair, 
and unscrupulous contractors will take the money and leave the repairs undone. NHS of Chi-
cago administers the forgivable loan program for the city because city officials have 
recognized that NHS of Chicago can augment these funds with money from private investors.  
Counseling Programs 
NHS of Chicago receives over 100 calls a month for homeownership preservation assistance. 
Based on the homeowner’s situation, the trained staff then directs the caller toward the ap-
propriate solution, which may include a negotiated payment plan, legal assistance, 
conventional refinancing or some type of loan. NHS of Chicago receives referrals from its 
lender partners, through the city’s anti-predatory-lending and consumer-education campaign, 
from its role as a HUD-certified counselor and by working with neighborhood organizations.  
Results 
HOPI partners have prevented 690 foreclosures in the first 18 months of the initiative. The 
city has established a “311 Home Ownership Preservation Campaign” that allows homeown-
ers at risk of foreclosure to call a non-emergency 311 line to talk to a credit counselor. A 
series of workshops have provided incentives to customers in high-risk neighborhoods to at-
tend informational sessions prior to the possibility of experiencing any financial difficulty.  
Foreclosure rates in low-income and minority neighborhoods in Chicago declined in 2003 for 
the first time in a decade. Foreclosures in low-income neighborhoods — those with incomes 
up to 50 percent of area median income — declined by 17 percent, from 2,958 in 2002 to 
2,460 in 2003, while foreclosures in moderate-income neighborhoods declined 13 percent, 
from 3,827 to 3,339, during that period; at the same time foreclosures dropped just 4.5 per-
cent in higher income neighborhoods (NTIC 2004). In predominantly minority 
neighborhoods, foreclosures declined 16 percent from 2002 to 2003 while declining only 3.8 
percent in other neighborhoods (NTIC 2004). 
In their preservation program, NHS of Chicago has also reclaimed 111 formerly vacant prop-
erties through development activities and purchase-rehab lending. A number of financial 
institutions have donated or sold at discount some low-value properties to NHS for preserva-
tion. NHS of Chicago and the city of Chicago have also partnered with HUD to reclaim 
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foreclosed FHA properties. In addition, the City Council passed the Troubled Buildings Ini-
tiative II, which provides financial resources to rehabilitate abandoned properties.  
NHS of Chicago has also worked hard to promote a better understanding of the impact of 
foreclosures on community development, including publishing the report mentioned above, 
Preserving Home Ownership: Community-Development Implications of the New Mortgage 
Market. In addition, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation is establishing a Center for 
Foreclosure Solutions to explore how community organizations across the country can learn 
from the experiences of Chicago and other cities in preventing foreclosure.  
Lessons Learned 
NHS of Chicago staff found that the NORMAL program needs to be tied to a full range of 
counseling and information services to be fully effective, which they accomplished with the 
establishment of HOPI. Financing needs to be flexible, and payments need to be kept low 
enough to allow homeowners a chance to succeed. The staff also cite the importance of seek-
ing additional funding that may be available, such as closing-cost assistance or rehabilitation 
grants.  
NHS staff warn that foreclosure-prevention programs are time- and labor-intensive and that 
they can put a strain on an agency’s resources. But they also feel these programs are essential 
to assuring that target neighborhoods do not see a significant increase in failed homeowner-
ship cases and abandoned properties. NHS of Chicago Executive Director Bruce Gottschall is 
convinced that foreclosures have a “contagion effect,” whereby a number of foreclosures 
tends to cause more foreclosures: “one foreclosure often prompts another and another and in 
no time a decade of neighborhood revitalization work can be undone” (Apgar et al 2004). 
Foreclosures and Neighborhood Revitalization in New York City 
Neighborhood Housing Services of New York City was established in 1982 and has assisted 
nearly 100,000 residents, rehabilitated 6,000 housing units and stimulated more than $950 
million in public and private investment. Using its own architects and rehab specialists, NHS 
of NYC has made 23,000 home inspections and conducted more than 1,500 home repair 
workshops. Its HomeBuyers Clubs and counseling programs have prepared residents for 
homeownership. It has also packaged first mortgage loans valued at more than $175 million. 
NHS of NYC focuses its efforts on traditionally underserved, minority neighborhoods in all 
five boroughs, including Harlem and the Lower East Side in Manhattan; Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
East New York, East Flatbush, Red Hook and Erasmus in Brooklyn; West Brighton in Staten 
Island; the South Bronx and the North Bronx; and Jamaica, South Ozone Park, Richmond 
Hill, Woodside, Long Island City, Jackson Heights, the Coronas, and Elmhurst in Queens. 
The Rise of Foreclosures in New York Neighborhoods 
The neighborhoods were examined using data from the New York City Housing and 
Neighborhood Information System (NYCHANIS), administered by the Furman Center for 
Real Estate and Urban Policy at New York University. The neighborhood definitions and 
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names are for “subborough areas” created by the Census Bureau for the administration of the 
New York Housing and Vacancy Survey. The subborough areas roughly approximate the 
neighborhoods served by NHS of NYC. Some names used for the subborough areas were 
abbreviated in this report. The database provided by the Furman Center provides a wide vari-
ety of data using various geographic definitions; more information is at 
www.law.nyu.edu/realestatecenter/nychanis/index.html.  
Foreclosures in New York City increased by more than 25 percent between 2000 and 2003, 
but the hardest hit neighborhoods were all among the NHS of NYC target neighborhoods. 
Seven of these neighborhoods had foreclosure rates in 2003 that were more than twice the 
city rate: Jamaica, University Heights in the North Bronx, Queens Village, East New York, 
East Flatbush, Williamsbridge in the North Bronx, and South Ozone Park. Three more target 
neighborhoods had foreclosure rates higher than the city rate and are of particular concern to 
NHS staff: South Crown Heights, Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick. Although containing 
less than 20 percent of the city’s population, these ten neighborhoods accounted for 60 per-
cent of the city’s foreclosures in 2003.  
Jamaica is the largest of the neighborhoods, with more than 42,000 homeowners in 2002. In 
2003, it also had the largest number of foreclosures, 664, or more than 1.5 percent of the 
owned units, a growth of more than 20 percent since 2000. The other neighborhoods have 
seen lower rates than Jamaica’s, but a number of them experienced greater growth in foreclo-
sures. For example, East Flatbush has seen a 50 percent increase in foreclosures since 2000, 
rising from 86 to 131.  
Table 3: Foreclosure Rates for Selected NHS of New York City Target 
Neighborhoods and the Rest of New York City, 2000 to 2003
 
Neighborhood 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Jamaica 1.29% 1.41% 1.51% 1.55% 
University Heights 0.92% 0.92% 1.54% 1.54% 
Queens Village 0.84% 0.93% 0.98% 0.99% 
East New York 0.59% 0.76% 0.74% 0.77% 
East Flatbush 0.53% 0.76% 0.82% 0.81% 
Williamsbridge 0.60% 0.61% 0.83% 0.78% 
South Ozone Park 0.47% 0.62% 0.57% 0.63% 
South Crown Heights 0.28% 0.54% 0.57% 0.54% 
Bedford-Stuyvesant 0.31% 0.27% 0.34% 0.35% 
Bushwick 0.20% 0.34% 0.23% 0.30% 
Rest of City 0.11% 0.11% 0.13% 0.13% 
Citywide 0.22% 0.25% 0.27% 0.28% 
Source: Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University. 
In most respects these neighborhoods are not much different from New York City overall 
(Table 4). However, all but two of the ten neighborhoods have significantly higher propor-
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tions of African-American residents, with six having percentages more than double the city-
wide percentage. 
Table 4: Selected Characteristics of High-Foreclosure Neighborhoods Served by 
NHS of New York City
 
Neighborhood Percent 
Black  
2000 
Median 
Income 
2002 
Change in 
Poverty Rate 
1990 to 2000 
Median Housing 
Value 
2002 
Jamaica 74.4% $42,000  3.2% $161,462 
University Heights 37.9% $20,800 –3.5% $161,462 
Queens Village 56.7% $54,348  1.8% $188,372 
East New York 50.0% $30,000  2.5% $177,608 
East Flatbush 79.6% $36,600  4.9% $194,831 
Williamsbridge 69.2% $33,000  7.7% $193,755 
South Ozone Park 17.4% $45,800  4.5% $193,755 
South Crown Heights 81.7% $32,000  5.8% $188,372 
Bedford-Stuyvesant 77.6% $24,840 –0.8% $193,755 
Bushwick 27.2% $24,800 –4.0% $177,608 
Citywide 27.3% $39,100  2.0% $188,756 
Source: Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University. 
These neighborhoods have also seen a significant increase in subprime lending (Table 5). Be-
tween 2000 and 2002, subprime lending in the ten neighborhoods increased approximately 
60 percent. With 20 percent of New York’s population, the ten neighborhoods accounted for 
more than 40 percent of all subprime lending. Most of the subprime lending in these neigh-
borhoods was for refinances, accounting for three-quarters of all subprime loans. The rise of 
subprime lending has been linked to increased foreclosures in other parts of the New York 
metropolitan area (Abt 2002).  
Table 5: Subprime Loans in Selected NHS of New York City Neighborhoods: 
2000–2002
 
Neighborhood 2000 2001 2002 % Change 2000–02 
Jamaica 989 1,131 1,538 55.5% 
University Heights 63 73 81 28.6% 
Queens Village 799 1,054 1,417 77.4% 
East New York 340 394 533 56.8% 
East Flatbush 434 566 699 61.1% 
Williamsbridge 401 451 663 65.3% 
South Ozone Park 367 431 659 79.6% 
South Crown Heights 142 161 225 58.5% 
Bedford-Stuyvesant 369 400 492 33.3% 
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Bushwick 226 275 289 27.9% 
All 10 4,130 4,936 6,596 59.7% 
Citywide 8,425 11,312 15,896 88.7% 
Source: Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University. 
NHS of NYC staff is also concerned about outright predatory lending and fraud in the home-
improvement business. For example, clients in mortgage default have told staff they were 
directed to falsify income levels so they could be approved for their mortgage. There have 
also been cases of investors buying inexpensive properties — some of which had been fore-
closed upon — making a few cosmetic improvements, and then selling the homes at vastly 
inflated prices.  
NHS of NYC’s Response to Foreclosures 
NHS of NYC is a NeighborWorks® Full-Cycle Lender®, providing pre- and postpurchase 
counseling and education, as well as closing-cost and down-payment assistance. Its foreclo-
sure-prevention program includes early-delinquency intervention, foreclosure-prevention 
orientation, a predatory-lending awareness orientation, one-on-one counseling and a five-
week foreclosure-prevention class.  
NHS of NYC staff knows that the sooner a delinquent homeowner contacts them, the more 
likely they will be able to prevent a foreclosure. In order to alert homeowners of these ser-
vices, the foreclosure-prevention staff has been holding forums in target neighborhoods, 
particularly Jamaica, to help get the word out. Through a partnership with New York’s utility 
company Con Ed, contact information is also provided on utility bills, putting the foreclo-
sure-prevention number in front of homeowners every month. NHS of NYC is also seeking 
to be included as an option on the city’s “311” consumer information line.  
The foreclosure-prevention orientation is an overview of options related to loss mitigation, 
emphasizing how delinquent borrowers can prevent the loss of their homes. It covers what to 
do when making mortgage payments becomes difficult, how to assess finances and develop a 
budget, alternatives available to delinquent borrowers, and how to avoid predatory lenders 
and home-equity fraud. The foreclosure-prevention class covers these topics in depth, meet-
ing two hours a week for five weeks. Participants get hands-on training in managing income 
and debt and developing a household budget. The instructor provides information on bring-
ing a loan current, using loss-mitigation tools such as reducing monthly payments, getting a 
temporary deferment, modifying the loan terms or refinancing the mortgage.  
The success of the prepurchase counseling is evident to staff working in foreclosure preven-
tion. “We never had to do foreclosure-prevention counseling for anyone who had taken our 
prepurchase homeownership education classes,” says Ken Davis, foreclosure-prevention 
counselor.  
NHS of NYC also provides a course on losing one’s home with dignity, for those situations 
where the homeowner is unable to keep up with mortgage payments. Borrowers sometimes 
fall too far behind in their payments to be able to make the loan current again and, as a last 
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resort, are encouraged to sell the home themselves. Many buyers should not have been placed 
in their homes in the first place, but have been put there by unscrupulous brokers. Also, some 
homeowners experience significant income decline because of job loss or divorce, and no 
agreement with the bank will make the loan tenable.  
A reverse-mortgage program has also been established for elderly homeowners who need 
home repair work done, have trouble paying taxes, or have become victims of predatory 
lenders. The borrower can often get a reverse mortgage when they cannot obtain any other 
form of financing because of a lack of creditworthiness. The reverse mortgage allows the 
owners to stay in the home and make necessary repairs, and the owners’ heirs have up to a 
year to buy or sell the home.  
The Importance of Partnerships 
NHS of NYC has a successful foreclosure-prevention program because of the partnerships it 
has established. The organization collaborates with banks, pro bono legal services, the sec-
ondary market institutions, employers, corporations, foundations, nonprofit and faith-based 
organizations, and federal, state, and city officials, in all five boroughs. For example, NHS of 
NYC partners with Fannie Mae and the Parodneck Foundation to provide relief to senior citi-
zens who have been victimized by predatory lenders. It is also a member of the loss-mitiga-
tion team for HUD’s hot zones, which provides special loss-mitigation procedures for 
reinstating FHA loans facing foreclosure due to predatory lending.  
However, the organization’s most important partnerships are with local banks. Unlike NHS 
of Chicago, NHS of NYC does not have a loan fund, so it has to rely on the lender to agree to 
loan modifications that can save a home. The banks trust NHS of NYC, and appreciate that 
delinquent borrowers who are being assisted by its counseling programs have a greater 
chance of avoiding foreclosure. NHS of NYC helps borrowers get loan workouts, such as 
reducing outstanding balances or waiving late charges, legal fees and interest in arrears. Usu-
ally the mortgages become refinanced through the existing lender. NHS of NYC also uses its 
home-improvement program for any necessary repairs and seeks refinancing through other 
banks.  
“Our strength is our banking partners who see us as the means for delivering services they 
cannot,” says NHS of NYC Chief Operating Officer Bernell Grier. “When the issue involves 
homeownership, and they are looking for nonprofit partners, the banks come to us first. For 
example, a bank called us to establish a loan fund for people facing foreclosure, as they were 
anticipating an economic downturn and rising foreclosures. They came to us first because of 
our reputation and experience.”  
Lessons Learned 
NHS of NYC has found that foreclosure-prevention information should be presented as part 
of the prepurchase homeownership information session. This information should emphasize 
the importance of communicating with lenders as soon as trouble arises, to prevent more se-
vere problems.  
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Staff must be familiar with the lending staff, servicing staff and, most importantly, the rules 
and procedures for loss mitigation of the local financial institutions. Conversely, it is also 
important to keep banking staff informed of NHS program guidelines and goals and to get 
their support for the program. NHS of NYC often serves as the liaison between the bank and 
the borrower, so good relations with the bank’s professional staff is key to success. Good 
communication and mediation skills are necessary, since negotiating with lenders and ser-
vicers is a critical part of the program.  
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Section V: Conclusions 
Creating homeownership opportunities has long been a central strategy for community revi-
talization. Increasing homeownership rates in distressed areas provides a number of positive 
benefits to the community, including stabilizing the local housing market and creating stake-
holders for further revitalization. It also benefits low-income households, providing them 
with their primary means for building wealth.  
Increases in homeownership rates are not due just to the efforts of community developers, 
but also have been made possible by new, innovative mortgage products specifically de-
signed for low-income families. Underwriting advances, specifically risk-based pricing, and 
stratified securitization have allowed lenders to provide mortgages to households that may 
not have qualified for them prior to these developments. Low-income homebuyers with 
lower credit ratings and fewer savings for down payments can now find mortgage products 
that meet their needs. Many of them qualify for subprime loans, paying more for their access 
to capital in exchange for the increased risk that lenders are taking.  
This loan risk can be mitigated by prepurchase counseling programs that help new home-
owners understand how to handle their finances and make their monthly payments so as to 
retain their homes. Prepurchase counseling, properly provided, has been shown to reduce de-
fault rates (Hirad and Zorn 2001). Moreover, postpurchase counseling and foreclosure-
prevention programs, such as those described in this report, also help to mitigate the risk of 
subprime lending, reducing the number of mortgages that actually go to foreclosure. These 
community-based efforts are crucial to ensuring that the increase in lending risk that risk-
based pricing has allowed is minimized. 
Over the past several years, however, the rate of subprime foreclosures has been on the rise, 
though it has declined somewhat in the past two years. A substantial amount of evidence 
suggests that this increase has been concentrated in low-income and minority neighborhoods, 
with some indication that foreclosure rates in those neighborhoods may also be declining 
(NTIC 2004). The cause for this recent decline in foreclosure rates has not been determined, 
but it is likely that some credit belongs to the activities of community organizations that have 
been active in fighting foreclosures. The NTIC data is from Chicago, which has one of the 
most sophisticated community-based foreclosure programs in the country.  
As subprime lending increases in distressed neighborhoods — neighborhoods that tend to 
have high proportions of low-income and minority populations — the need for sophisticated 
foreclosure-prevention programs also increases. It is likely that foreclosure-prevention pro-
grams will demonstrate success similar to their prepurchase counterparts. While they are 
resource-intensive, these programs can protect distressed communities from the possible 
negative consequences of higher-risk lending.  
The models that have been developed to allow riskier lending do not take into account the 
contagion effect that concentrated foreclosures appear to produce, particularly in areas where 
the housing market is not strong. In part this is because sufficient research has yet to be done 
which would allow an estimation of the effect. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, there 
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is some anecdotal evidence that the contagion effect exists (and many practitioners would 
attest to it) and that the cost of foreclosure can go beyond the impact on an individual home. 
Therefore, the risk that is allowed for loans in these communities needs to be counterbal-
anced by programs that reduce the chance of foreclosure. 
A number of approaches to preventing foreclosure, or to mitigating its effects, have been de-
scribed here. The proactive approach of NHS of Chicago, working with the subprime lenders 
directly and developing best practices for mortgage originations, seems to have the potential 
for highly significant benefits. In addition, there is a need for an expanded public sector role 
in developing financial literacy and in improving disclosure and reporting requirements to 
assure that homebuyers understand their options and can select the best product for them-
selves, as has been suggested in another analysis (Collins et al. 2004). This analysis also 
suggests an expanded oversight role for regulators and endorses the concept of origination 
best practices.  
However, it should also be remembered that most loan foreclosures are not consequent to 
subprime loans; many more prime loans are made than subprime, and foreclosures occur on 
those loans as well. While subprime loans foreclose at a higher rate and a shorter time from 
origination, foreclosure-prevention activities must also address those issues that go beyond 
subprime lending and look at issues such as equity dilution and job security. When foreclo-
sure cannot be prevented, programs for selling homes quickly, like the ones developed by 
NHS of Chicago and NOAH, can help to eliminate the contagion effect.  
The recent increase in foreclosures in low-income and minority neighborhoods threatens the 
positive work of community development. Sustaining homeownership is becoming as impor-
tant an activity as creating it. Reducing foreclosures through efforts such as counterbalancing 
loan risk should not be left to community-based organizations alone. Public officials and 
lending institutions should be actively involved in supporting actions that reduce the likeli-
hood of a loan going from default to foreclosure. The costs of foreclosure go beyond the 
impact to the borrower. Preventing foreclosures is cost-beneficial and provides a public bene-
fit.  
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